

# From Human-Subject Experiments To Computational-Agent Experiments

---

**(And Everything In Between)**

**Presenter**

Leigh Tesfatsion

Professor of Economics,

Courtesy Professor of Mathematics and  
Electrical & Computer Engineering

[https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/  
tesfatsi@iastate.edu](https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/tesfatsi@iastate.edu)

ISU Experimental/Behavioral Economics Workshop

17 February 2011

# Presentation Outline

---

## □ Spectrum of Possible Experiments

- 100% human → 100% computational agents


## □ What is Agent-based Comp Econ (ACE)?

- 100% computational agents
- **Example:** Electric power market test bed

## □ Towards Integrated Human-Computational Test Beds

- Parallel experiments with humans and comp agents
- Platforms permitting human & comp-agent participants
- <https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aexper.htm>

# Spectrum of Possible Experiments



# What is ACE ?

---

- ◆ **Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE)**
- ◆ Computational modeling of economic processes (including whole economies) as open-ended dynamic systems of interacting “agents”.
- ◆ ***Goal:*** Development of empirically-grounded dynamic economic theories in which equilibrium is a possible outcome rather than a constraint imposed in advance.

# Meaning of “Agent” in ACE

---

**Agent** =: Encapsulated bundle of data, attributes, and/or methods within a computationally constructed world

□ Agents can represent

- **Individuals:** consumers, traders, entrepreneurs, ...
- **Social groupings:** households, communities, ...
- **Institutions:** markets, corporations, gov't agencies, ...
- **Biological entities:** crops, livestock, forests, ...
- **Physical entities:** weather, landscape, electric grids, ...


# Meaning of “Agent” in ACE ...

---

**Decision-making agents** can exhibit:

- Behavioral adaptation
- Goal-directed learning
- Social communication (talking with each other!)
- Endogenous formation of interaction networks
- **Autonomy:**  
Self-activation and self-determination based on private internal data and methods as well as on external data streams (including from real world)

# Illustration: Partial UML Diagram for Agent Relationships in an ACE Macroeconomic Model



↑ = "is a"    ↓ = "has a"

# Importance of Agent Encapsulation

---

- ❑ Real-world economies consist of distributed entities with limited information & computational capabilities.
- ❑ **ACE modeling forces adherence to this constraint.**
  - An ACE model is a collection of computational “agents,” i.e., encapsulated bundles of data, methods, and/or attributes.
  - An intended action of an agent at any given instant is completely determined/constrained by the data, methods, and/or attributes of this agent at this instant.
- ❑ **In principle, any decision-making agent in an ACE model can be replaced by a human being who is constrained to use this agent’s input/output interfaces.**



# Example: Power Generation Company (GenCo)

## Public Access:

### // Public Methods

Methods for receiving data;  
Methods for retrieving GenCo data;

## Private Access:

### // Private Methods

Methods for gathering, storing, and sending data;  
Methods for calculating own expected & actual net earnings;  
Method for updating own supply offers (**LEARNING**).

### // Private Data

Own capacity, grid location, cost function, current wealth... ;  
Data recorded about external world (prices, dispatch,...);  
Address book (communication links);

# ACE Culture-Dish Analogy

---

- ◆ ACE modeler constructs a **virtual economic world populated by various agent types.**
- ◆ Modeler sets initial agent states (data, attributes, and/or methods).
- ◆ Modeler then steps back to observe how the **world develops in real (CPU) time without further intervention from the modeler** (i.e., no externally imposed coordination constraints such as demand=supply, fulfilled expectations, etc.)
- ◆ World events are **driven by agent interactions.**

# ACE and Market Design

---

## Key Issues:

- ◆ Will a proposed or actual market design promote **efficient, fair, and orderly social outcomes over time**?
- ◆ Will the design give rise to **unintended consequences**?

## ACE Culture-Dish Approach:


- ◆ **Develop a computational world (test bed)** embodying market design, physical constraints, decision makers, ...
- ◆ **Set initial world conditions** (agent data & methods).
- ◆ **Let the world evolve** with no further intervention, and observe and evaluate the resulting outcomes.

## ***Example:* Using ACE Test Beds for the Study of Electric Power Market Designs**

---

- ◆ The **restructured electric power markets** that are being implemented in many industrialized economies around the world are immensely complex.
- ◆ They involve increased systematic consideration of
  - 1) Physical constraints & ancillary service needs**
  - 2) Institutional arrangements & incentives**
  - 3) Behavioral responses of human traders/operators**
- ★ To be useful and informative, power market studies need to consider all three elements 1) thru 3).

# U.S. Wholesale Electric Power Transmission Grid




# Market Design Proposed in 2003 by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

---

- Wholesale power markets to be managed by *independent system operators (ISOs)* without any ownership/financial stake
  - ***Two-settlement system:*** Concurrent operation of day-ahead (forward) & real-time (intra-day) markets
  - Transmission grid congestion managed via ***Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs)***, where  $LMP(b,T)$  at grid bus  $b$  for operating period  $T$  =: Least system cost of delivering 1 additional energy unit (MWh) at  $b$  during  $T$
  - ***Market power mitigation*** by price caps & other controls
- ➔ Has led in practice to complex systems difficult to analyze using standard analytical & statistical tools or standard (100% human) laboratory experiments.

# Seven US Energy Regions Have Adopted FERC's Market Design to Date (2011)

## Electric Power Markets: National Overview




☑ = FERC Market Design Adopted

# Actual Electricity Prices in Midwest ISO (MISO)

April 25, 2006, at 19:55


Note this price, \$156.35





# Five Minutes Later...


73% drop in price in 5 minutes !



# Actual Electricity Prices in Midwest ISO (MISO)


## September 5, 2006, 14:30

Note this price, \$226.25



# Five Minutes Later ...

79% drop in price in 5 minutes!



# ACE Test Bed Project: Integrated Retail/Wholesale Power System Operation with Smart-Grid Functionality

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/irwprojecthome.htm>

---

**Project Directors:** Leigh Tesfatsion (Prof. of Econ, Courtesy Prof. of Math, & ECpE, ISU)

Dionysios Aliprantis (Litton Industries Ass't Prof. of ECpE, ISU)

David Chassin (Staff Scientist, PNNL/Department of Energy)

**Research Assoc's:** Dr. Junjie Sun (Fin. Econ, OCC, U.S. Treasury, Wash, D.C.)

Dr. Hongyan Li (Consulting Eng., ABB Inc., Raleigh, NC)

**Research Assistants:**

Huan Zhao (Econ PhD student, ISU)

Chengrui Cai (ECpE PhD student, ISU)

Pedram Jahangiri (ECpE PhD student, ISU)

Auswin Thomas (ECpE M.S. student, ISU)

**Current Government & Industry Funding Support:**

PNNL/DOE, and the Electric Power Research Center (EPRC),  
an industrial consortium

**Industry Advisors:** PNNL/DOE, XM, RTE, MEC, and Midwest ISO

# Wholesale Power Market Design Proposed in 2003 by the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)

---


- Market to be managed by an ***Independent System Operator (ISO)*** or ***Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)*** with no ownership or financial stake in market operations
- ***Two-settlement system:*** Daily concurrent operation of a separately settled day-ahead (forward) market & a real-time (intra-day) market
- Transmission grid congestion managed via **Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs)**, where:
  - ***LMP(k,T) (\$/MWh) at a grid bus k during an operating period T*** is the least incremental (“marginal”) system cost of servicing a 1MW increase in the power level (MW) to be maintained at b during T, starting from a currently planned maintained power level at b during T
- Oversight & market power mitigation by outside agency

# Complexity of FERC Market Design

## Example: MISO Business Practices Manual 001

DART = Day-Ahead and Real-Time Market System

Exhibit 2-3: DART Components Overview




DART Two-Settlement System = Core of FERC Market Design

# Project Test-System Approach

## Integrated Retail/Wholesale (IRW) Power System Test Bed

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/IRWProjectHome.htm>



# Integrated Human/Computational Test Beds for Social Science Research, Teaching, & Training

---

- ❑ **Integrated Test Bed (ITB)** =: Software platform permitting decision-making (DM) agents to range from 100% human to 100% computational
  - Modular extensible architecture
  - Open source availability
  - Development of multiple application-tailored ITBs



# Advantages of Integrated Test Beds for Social Science Research, Teaching, & Training

---

- ❑ Social systems are highly complicated.
- ❑ Global regularities arise over time from the interactions of many distributed micro entities.
- ❑ These interactions are channelled & constrained by current
  - structural conditions
  - institutional arrangements
  - behavioral dispositionsthat in turn can *change and evolve*.
- ❑ Emergence of global regularities can take a long time.

# Integrated *Test Beds (ITBs)* can Facilitate the Study of Real-World Economic Processes

---

- ITBs permit more realistic experimental environments for human subjects by letting **Computational Agents (CAs)** represent critical but complicated real-world aspects.
- ITBs permit the systematic study of human behavior within controlled group settings (small → large) because CAs can be included to represent “others” in these groups.
- ITBs permit *in situ* training of decision-making CAs to embody human decision-making behaviors, which can then be used in longer-run dynamic experimental studies not practical for human subject participation.

# Existing Integrated Test Beds in Economics ?

---

## □ Some research combining Humans/CAs

- Roth/Murnighan 1978; Coursey et al. 1984; Brown/Kruse 1991
- Houser/Kurzban 2002; Johnson et al. 2002, Rassenti et al. 2003
- Entriken/Wan/Chao 2003

## □ Not much publicly available ITB software

- Multi-Agent Simulation Suite developed by Ivanyi et al. (2007) supports “participatory simulation” (some agents can be controlled by human users)
- GEEP (Rob Goldstone, foraging project, 2009)

# In Contrast ....

---

## □ Many calls for parallel human-agent experiments

(Jager/Janssen 2003, Contini et al. 2006, Markose 2006, Duffy 2006, LeBaron/Tesfatsion 2008...)

## □ Various parallel studies have already been carried out

- Gode/Sunder 1993; Arifovic 1993; Bousquet 1997;
- Chan, LeBaron, Lo, & Poggio 1999; Duffy 2001; Jager/Janssen 2003;
- Pingle/Tesfatsion 2003; Rouchier 2003, 2005; Kurzban/Houser 2005;
- Duffy 2006; Invanyi, Bocsi, Gulyas, Kozma, & Legendi 2007;
- Spiliopoulos 2008; Hommes/Lux 2009, ...

**ACE Research Area: Experiments with Real & Computational Agents**

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aexper.htm>

# Parallel-Experiment Synergies

## □ Human-Subject Experiments → ACE

- Empirical microfoundations for decision-making & learning
- Empirical validation of outcomes
- Empirical regularities in need of explanation

# Parallel Experiment Synergies ...

---

## □ ACE Human-Subject Experiments


- Benchmarks of comparison (zero-intelligence trading; control of social histories, motivations, types...)
- Intensive controlled study of necessary as well as sufficient conditions for observed human outcomes
- Extension of human-subject experiments in scope & time (wealth creation, learning dynamics, emergent types,...)

# Systematic Use of Parallel Experiments

## Iterative Participatory Modeling

(See F. Bousquet, O. Barreteau, et al., *JASSS* 2003)

---



# Conclusion

---

- \* **Human Subject (HS) experiments** permit careful study of micro human behaviors in controlled lab settings.
- \* **Computational Agent (CA) experiments** permit controlled study of complex processes over extended time.
- \* Advantages could be jointly exploited thru **Integrated Test Beds (ITBs)** permitting decision-making entities to range from 100% human to 100% computational.
- \* Current research on parallel HS/CA implementations could be used as the basic starting point for ITB development.



# On-Line Resources

---

## ◆ Presentation Slides

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/BehExperTalk.LT.pdf>

## ◆ Key Reference Paper: P. Borill & L. Tesfatsion, “Agent-Based Modeling: The Right Mathematics for the Social Sciences?,” Elgar Volume, 2011, to appear.

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/ABMRightMath.PBLTWP.pdf>

## ◆ Experiments with Real & Computational Agents

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/aexper.htm>

## ◆ Integrated Retail-Wholesale Project: Homepage

<https://www2.econ.iastate.edu/tesfatsi/irwprojecthome.htm>