

The Enron Scandal and Moral Hazard



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- Enron, the 7th largest U.S. company in 2001, ***filed for bankruptcy*** in December 2001.
- Enron investors and retirees were left with ***worthless stock***.
- Enron was charged with ***securities fraud*** (fraudulent manipulation of publicly reported financial results, lying to SEC,...)
- **Key QUESTION:** In what ways are **security market moral hazard problems** at the heart of the Enron bankruptcy scandal?

Brief Time-Line of the Enron Scandal


- Enron was a Houston-based natural gas pipeline company formed by merger in 1985.
- By early 2001, Enron had morphed into the 7th largest U.S. company, and the largest U.S. buyer/seller of natural gas and electricity.
- Enron was heavily involved in energy brokering, electronic energy trading, global commodity and options trading, etc.

Brief Time-Line of the Enron Scandal ...

- On October 16, 2001, in the first major public sign of trouble, Enron announces a huge third-quarter loss of \$618 million.
- On October 22, 2001, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) begins an inquiry into Enron's accounting practices.
- On December 2, 2001, Enron *files for bankruptcy*.


Buying as the Ship Went Down : Oct – Dec 2001

On the advice of Alliance Capital Management, one of its investment managers, the Florida state pension fund bought Enron stock even as the company's troubles became known. A former Alliance executive, Frank Savage, is also a member of Enron's board.



Sources: Dow Jones Interactive (stock price); Office of Senator Bill Nelson

Regulatory Oversight of Enron



Investigative Findings

★ 1993-2001: Enron engaged in **complex dubious energy trading schemes**

□ Example: “Death Star” Energy Trading Strategy

- Took advantage of a loophole in the market rules governing energy trading in California
- Enron would schedule electric power transmission on a congested line from bus A to bus B in the opposite direction to demand, thus enabling them to collect a “congestion reduction” fee for seemingly relieving congestion on this line.
- Enron would then schedule the routing of this energy all the way back to bus A so that *no energy was actually bought or sold by Enron in net terms*. It was purely a routing scheme.

Investigative Findings ...

- ★ 1993-2001: Enron also used **complex & dubious accounting schemes**
 - *to reduce* Enron's tax payments;
 - *to inflate* Enron's income and profits;
 - *to inflate* Enron's stock price and credit rating;
 - *to hide* losses in off-balance-sheet subsidiaries;
 - to engineer off-balance-sheet schemes to *funnel money* to themselves, friends, and family;
 - *to fraudulently misrepresent* Enron's financial condition in public reports.

WHY WASN'T ENRON STOPPED SOONER!

Case Study of One Accounting Scheme

(Based on WSJ site & lecture notes prepared by Prof. Sue Ravenscroft, ISU)

- Enron's rapid growth in late 1990s involved large capital investments not expected to generate significant cash flow in short term.
- Maintaining Enron's credit ratings at an investment grade (e.g., BBB- or higher by S&P) was vital to Enron's energy trading business.

Case Study ... Continued


- One perceived solution: Create partnerships structured as *special purpose entities (SPEs)* that could borrow from outside investors without having to be consolidated into Enron's balance sheet.
- **SPE 3% Rule:** No consolidation needed if at least 3% of SPE total capital was owned independently of Enron.

Case Study ... Continued

- **Enron's creation of over 3000 partnerships** started about 1993 when it teamed with **Calpers (California Public Employees' Retirement System)** to create **JEDI (Joint Energy Development Investments)** fund.
- Enron initially thought of these partnerships as temporary solutions for temporary cash flow problems.
- **Enron later used SPE partnerships under 3% rule to hide bad bets** it had made on speculative assets by selling these assets to the partnerships in return for IOUs backed by Enron stock as collateral! (over \$1 billion by 2002)


1993

CALPERS



Case Study... Continued

- In Nov 1997, Calpers wants to cash out of JEDI.
- To keep JEDI afloat, Enron needs new 3% partner.
- It creates another partnership **Chewco** (named for the Star Wars character Chewbacca) to buy out Calpers' stake in JEDI for \$383 million.
- Enron plans to back short-term loans to Chewco to permit it to buy out Calper's stake for \$383 million.



This is the plan....

Case Study...Continued

- Chewco **needs** \$383 million to give Calpers
- It gets.....
 - \$240 mil loan from Barclay's bank
(**guaranteed by Enron**)
 - \$132 mil credit from JEDI
(**whose only asset is Enron stock**)
- Chewco **still must get 3% of \$383 million (about \$11.5 million) from some outside source** to avoid inclusion of JEDI's debt on Enron's books (SEC filing, 1997).


Case Study...Continued

Chewco Capital Structure: Outside 3%

- \$125,000 from William Dodson & **Michael Kopper** (an aide to Enron CFO Fastow)
- \$11.4 mil loans from **Big River and Little River** (two new companies formed by Enron expressly for this purpose **who get a loan from Barclay's Bank**)

More Complications for Enron!

- **Barclay's Bank** begins to **doubt** the strength of the new companies Big River and Little River.
- It **requires a cash reserve of \$6.6 million** to be deposited (as security) for the \$11.4 million dollar loans.
- This cash reserve is **paid by JEDI**, whose net worth by this time consists solely of **Enron** stock, putting **Enron** in the at-risk position for this amount (red arrow on the next slide.)



Case Study... Continued

“Oh, what a tangled web we
weave when first we practice
to deceive!”

Walter Scott, Marimon, VI


Profit to Enron from all of this?

- Enron received \$10 million in guaranteed fee + a fee-based on loan balance to JEDI.
- Enron received a total of \$25.7 mil revenues from this source.
- In first quarter of 2000, the increase in price of Enron stock held by JEDI resulted in \$126 million in profits to Enron.

Profit to Enron from all of this ... ?

- **But everything fell apart when Enron's share price started to drop in Fall 2000 (dot.com bubble burst ↓).**
- In November 2001, Enron admitted to the SEC that Chewco was not truly independent of Enron.
- Chewco went bankrupt shortly after this Enron admission.

Who is to Blame for the Enron Scandal?



Who is to Blame for the Enron Scandal?

- **Lax accounting** by Arthur Anderson (AA) Co ?
- **“Rogue” AA auditor David Duncan** (fired 1/15/02) ?
- **Enron’s senior management** for hiding losses in dubious off-balance-sheet partnerships ?
- **CFO Andrew Fastow** for setting up these partnerships (6-year prison sentence 9/26/2004) ?
- **Timothy Belden** (trading schemes, 2yrs probation 2007) ?
- **CEO Jeff Skilling** (24-year prison sentence 10/23/06) ?
- **CEO Kenneth Lay** (died 7/23/06 with charges pending) ?
- **Media exaggeration and frenzy** ?
- **Stock analysts** who kept pushing Enron stock ?

Bad Accounting Practices?

Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (Prior to 2002):

- Auditing companies often **consult** for the companies they audit (conflict of interest).
- Audit company partners often later **accept jobs** from their client companies.
- Companies often retain the same auditing company for **long periods of time**.
- Auditing companies have been allowed to **police themselves**.

Bad Accounting Practices?

Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (Prior to 2002) ...

- Appointment of auditor company is *in theory* by shareholders, but *in practice* by senior management
- Audit Committee members often are **not independent** of senior management -- insiders are the ones with the most accurate understanding.
- Audit Committee members have typically been **required** to own company stock to align their incentives with those of company.

Other Dubious Practices?

- Board of Directors have traditionally been **paid largely in stock** to align their interests with shareholders.
- Directors **can sell out early** based on insider information.
- When senior executives are charged with failure to abide by SEC rulings, **the company typically pays the resulting fines.**

Lessons from the Enron Scandal

- Demonstrated the importance of “old economy” questions: How does the company **actually** make its money? Is it **sustainable** over the long haul? Is it **legal**!
- Demonstrated the need for significant reform in accounting and corporate governance in the U.S.
- Does this necessarily mean **government regulation** can fix the problem?

Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002

- **U.S. legislative response** to recent spate of accounting scandals (Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia Communications...)
- **Compliance with comprehensive reform of accounting procedures is now required for publicly held companies**, to promote and improve the quality and transparency of financial reporting by internal and external auditors.

Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002

- Companies must **list and track performance of their material risks and associated control procedures.**
- CEOs are required to **vouch for the financial statements of their companies.**
- Boards of Directors must have Audit Committees whose members are **independent** of company senior management.
- Companies can **no longer make loans to company directors.**

SOX Act of 2002 ... Continued

- SOX Act is essentially a response to **one** cause of the financial irregularities: failure by auditors, SEC, and other agencies to provide adequate oversight.
- Not clear how SOX Act will prevent misuse of “off-balance-sheet activities” that are difficult to trace.
- SOX Act also does not address **other** key causes:
 - ❖ ***misaligned incentives*** (e.g., shift from cash to stock option compensation)
 - ❖ ***focus on short-run profits*** rather than longer- run profit performance.

Getting Rid of SPE 3% Rule

- ***SPE 3% Rule***: Rule permitting Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) created by a firm to be treated as “off-balance-sheet” – i.e., no required consolidation with firm’s balance sheets – as long as at least 3% of the total capital of the SPE was owned independently of the firm.
- Rule raised to 10% in 2003 following Enron scandal
- After more misuse of rule during Subprime Financial Crisis, the ***Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)*** replaced this rule in 2009 with stricter consolidation standards on all asset reporting (***FASB 166 & 167***).

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