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Abstract

Although election news framing is a burgeoning area of research, empirical studies of what factors influence frame building remain rare, especially in non-Western countries. This study investigates the use of the strategic game frame and the relationship between that frame and system-level and organizational-level factors. The analysis focuses on the coverage of campaign news in six elite Bulgarian newspapers between 1990 and 2009. Results show that the type of electoral system, number of parties in government, and newspaper specialization are significant predictors of game frame use. The results are discussed in relation to framing research in Western Europe and the United States.

Keywords

framing, communication theory, print media, content analysis, international, political communication

The question of how the news media construct—or frame—politics has received much scholarly attention to date.¹ Although election news framing is a burgeoning area of research, there are still relatively few empirical studies of what factors influence the frame-building process outside Western Europe and the United States.

To be sure, certain trends in political news coverage have been observed on a global scale, including the trend toward higher personalization and portrayal of politics as a game or contest between political contenders, through the so-called *strategic game*

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frame.² However, it remains an open question if these trends are universal across countries and whether the framing of election news is different in nations characterized by different political and media systems.

In fact, some scholars have documented that global trends in political news coverage are not equally pronounced in all countries.³ Others have noted that country-level factors, such as political system, institutional factors, and media system characteristics, significantly influence media framing of political news.⁴ These findings, combined with the argument that media framing is significantly affected by country-level factors, underscore the need for framing research outside Western Europe and the United States, as there are reasons to believe that there may be different patterns of political news coverage. The present study extends prior framing research by testing the tenets of framing theory within a different national context.

To test the universality of framing theory, this study examines media framing in the post-Communist nation of Bulgaria. Following similar changes across Eastern Europe, the fall of the Communist regime in 1989 led to a deep and dramatic transformation of Bulgarian society and its political and media systems. New democratic institutions were established, which allowed Bulgarian citizens to participate in free multiparty elections for the first time since the end of Communism. After being a mouthpiece of the government for more than forty-five years, the news media offered a forum for free expression and became an important vehicle for defining the new political reality.

By examining the media framing of politics in an Eastern European country where election framing studies remain extremely rare,⁵ the present study is also able to determine whether findings from research conducted primarily in the West are applicable to other world regions. This is a worthwhile topic of investigation because the way the media frame political issues and events significantly affects audience knowledge, attitudes, and voting decisions.⁶ Finally, in a country such as Bulgaria, where freedom of expression and political rights were severely limited under the Communist regime, the process of media framing may have even more significant implications for citizen understanding of politics.

In addition to expanding election news framing research to a post-Communist country, the present study makes two other contributions to the framing literature. First, it investigates the impact of meso-level factors (as opposed to individual-level or country-level factors) on media frames, thus answering the call to put the sociological perspective back in framing research.⁷ Second, the analysis presented below employs a longitudinal research design and thus extends previous largely cross-sectional studies of media framing.

Media Framing of Politics

Sometimes described as a “fractured” paradigm, framing is based on the underlying assumption that the news media construct reality for the public, which includes citizens, policy makers, and journalists themselves.⁸ Broadly, frames can be found at two levels of analysis: at the level of media texts and also at the level of audience cognitions and interpretations.⁹ Partly because of their dual location, frames are difficult to

define. According to Gitlin, “[m]edia frames are persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation, of selection, emphasis, and exclusion, by which symbol-handlers routinely organize discourse, whether verbal or visual.”¹⁰ As Reese observed, this definition gives frames power to create a meaningful structure from “otherwise amorphous reality”—a process of reality construction that goes beyond simple inclusion or exclusion of certain pieces of information.¹¹ In the end, frames organize meaning and tell readers what the core or the essence of an issue is about and provide the context through which citizens interpret news.¹² This is particularly important in the case of political issues because people rarely have direct experience with politics and rely on news media as a primary source of political information.

Framing research in the United States and Western Europe demonstrates the dominance of one particular frame in election news: the so-called *strategic game frame*.¹³ In a nutshell, this frame portrays elections as an ongoing contest or horse race between candidates and parties and is often compared to typical sports coverage. The strategic game frame focuses on the winners and losers and highlights the opponents’ political strategies.¹⁴ Strategically framed news reporting on political campaigns often emphasizes what tactics politicians employ to move ahead in the polls or what strategies they develop to attract new voters.¹⁵ Some authors add the media focus on candidate characteristics and campaign metaframing as additional dimensions of the strategic game frame.¹⁶

Scholars have argued that strategic framing of politics takes place at the expense of substantive discussion of political issues.¹⁷ As a result, voters are left with partial or skewed understanding of the main issues and candidate stances on those issues.¹⁸ Furthermore, strategic framing tends to lead to mistrust in the political system and increase political cynicism among citizens.¹⁹ Alternatively, political news can focus on the substantive issues of the campaign and provide coverage of current policy proposals or actions. It is widely accepted that how the news media frame political issues significantly affects people’s knowledge, attitudes, and voting decisions.²⁰ There is less agreement, however, on what factors influence media framing.

The antecedents of news framing generally fall under two broad categories, system-level and organizational-level factors, although individual-level characteristics of reporters also play a role.²¹ At the national level, both the political system and the media system are critical in election news coverage.²² Starting with the political system, one fundamental distinction between types of democracies reflects the extent of societal representation captured in a country’s political institutions. In one version of democracy, the majoritarian type, government aims to represent only the majority of people, in many cases a bare majority of voters. In a consensus democracy, however, the goal is that governing institutions include as many people as possible in the political process.²³ Thus, in majoritarian democracies, there is a clear distinction between those who participate in the political process (i.e., those who support the government) and those who are excluded from it (the opposition). In consensus systems, on the other hand, no single political party has enough electoral support to govern by itself, which creates the need for parties to work together and to coordinate to form a multi-party cabinet, a situation that reflects and contributes to a less confrontational political climate.

A useful typology related to political coverage was proposed by Hallin and Mancini,²⁴ who distinguish among three different models of media and politics: a *democratic corporatist* model typical in the Scandinavian nations, a *liberal model* exemplified by the United States, and a *polarized pluralist* model characteristic of Southern Europe. They argue that to understand news media developments one needs to look at the evolution of the national media system, among other factors. Within each media system, the degree and nature of market competition, partisan bias, and professional norms in journalism are among the main factors that influence the frame-building process.²⁵

Although scholars agree that the characteristics of the political and media system influence the framing of politics, their relationship has rarely been investigated within the same country. Most studies follow a cross-cultural research design where it is difficult to control for the impact of culturally bound factors.²⁶ A country such as Bulgaria, where several major changes in society took place after 1989, presents a unique opportunity to test how political and media system factors relate to the framing of political issues and events.

The Context

Bulgaria has one of the most unstable political environments among the post-Communist countries, with seven parliamentary elections between 1990 and 2009 and eleven post-Communist cabinets, which differ on a number of dimensions, such as longevity, composition, and ideology. While all three are important characteristics of the political system, the number of parties in government plays a preeminent role in the way in which a government functions, and reflects the overall political culture in the society. Single-party majority governments, which characterize majoritarian-type democracies, represent a clear distinction between the winners and losers of the political process, that is, between the government and the opposition, and thus reflect a contentious political atmosphere.²⁷ On the other hand, “grand” coalitions or multiparty governments, that require the support of more than 50% of the legislature, indicate a political need to build a consensus where no single party could dominate the decision-making process. This longitudinal twenty-year study of media framing in Bulgaria allows us to investigate the role of two sets of political variables, reflecting the number of parties in government and the overall nature of the interaction among political actors, respectively.

In addition to diverse and multiple governments, Bulgaria’s political system is also characterized by three changes in its electoral systems in a twenty-year period, a situation that is rare even by the standards of unstable democracies. The first post-Communist election in 1990 was conducted under a mixed electoral system, closely resembling the German model, with 50% of the seats allocated through a winner-takes-all single member district (SMD) system, and the other 50% through proportional representation (PR). This mixed system, a compromise between the former Communist Party, which favored the SMD model, and the democratic opposition, which felt it would do better under a PR system, was abolished after one election

cycle. For most of the twenty-year period, Bulgaria used several varieties of PR, with the electoral threshold as the main difference between elections. Then, before the 2009 elections, the country once again switched to a mixed system, combining elements of SMD with PR, although the distribution of seats was dominated by the PR element. While small modifications of electoral laws are common in most European democracies, radical system changes are rather rare. Thus, the fluctuating political environment discussed above provides a productive platform for studying how political factors affect the way in which the media frame political news.

While the institutional differences between majoritarian and consensus democracies and their impact on policy are widely studied in comparative politics, there is much less research on the impact of different political arrangements on media coverage of politics. Nevertheless, there is substantial empirical evidence from research in the United States and Western Europe to suggest that the political system in a society will be reflected in the way media frame political news.

For example, when analyzing coverage of European news in Danish newspapers, de Vreese demonstrated that the weaker presence of strategic/game frames is explained by the consensus nature of the Danish democracy.²⁸ Similarly, Strömbäck and Dimitrova showed that the game frame dominates in the more contentious U.S. political environment, but is less common in consensus-oriented Sweden.²⁹ Hänggli and Kriesti added that in countries with direct-democratic procedures, the government has less influence in frame building.³⁰ More recently, Floss and Marcinkowski demonstrated that coverage of political news in Switzerland tends to reflect the consensus nature of its democracy.³¹ Given these considerations, we expect that majoritarian-type political systems will be associated with a more frequent use of the strategic game frame than consensus political systems.

Distinctions between majoritarian and consensus systems are not always straightforward, but two political system characteristics are useful indicators of different types of democracy. Majoritarian democracies are characterized with winner-takes-all (WTA) type electoral systems, which in turn reduce the number of legislative parties. While Bulgaria did not use a pure WTA electoral system, two of its elections (1990 and 2009) utilized a mixed electoral formula combining elements of WTA and PR. We expect that a mixed system, with a strong element of WTA, will have an impact on media framing that is similar to a pure WTA system. Another political system characteristic that reflects the nature of political discourse, and the extent to which it is consensus-based, is the number of parties in government. Governments composed of multiple, often ideologically distinct, parties characterize consensus-type democracies, encouraging more issue-focused discussion, while single-party majority governments dominate in majoritarian systems. Based on these considerations, we draw the following hypotheses:

- H1:** Existence of a mixed electoral system will be associated with more frequent use of the strategic game frame in election news coverage.
- H2:** Presence of a greater effective number of parties in government will be associated with less frequent use of the strategic game frame in election news coverage.

One of the fundamental changes in the Bulgarian media system after 1989 was the transition from a Communist press model to a competitive libertarian press model. This created the need for media organizations to become self-sufficient and learn how to operate and survive in a competitive media market. As a result, Bulgarian newspapers had to find ways to differentiate themselves to attract advertising support.³² This was the case for all print publications in the country, as state-funded newspapers ceased to exist after 1989. Currently, Bulgaria enjoys a diverse newspaper market, with more than 446 newspapers in business.³³ The major publications are printed in the capital Sofia, where competition is much more pronounced than in the regional markets, although both types of publications rely on advertising revenue as the main source of income. Consequently, as noted in a recent report on the state of the media in Bulgaria, “the battle for ratings is fierce.”³⁴ The palpable economic pressure and business imperatives are likely to lead to higher newspaper specialization. According to Shoemaker and Reese’s hierarchy of influences, differences at the organizational level stemming from different “ownership, goals and policy” significantly affect media coverage.³⁵ Under the current Bulgarian press system, general news media coexist with multiple specialized media—for instance, political or economic newspapers, which indeed serve different audience segments. Specialized publications have a distinctly different editorial focus, and that is likely to influence their election news coverage.

During the post-Communist transition a number of party newspapers emerged with the clear intent to focus on political issues to inform and mobilize their party’s political base.³⁶ Similar to other European countries, these newspapers had a left or right bias and tended to be affiliated with a particular political party. Although their political preferences may have been at the opposite ends of the political spectrum, their target audience was similar in the sense that it was a segment of the population interested in politics. As Shoemaker and Reese suggest,³⁷ party-affiliated newspapers have distinctly different organizational goals and editorial policies, which would necessitate more thorough and in-depth coverage of politics. Reflecting their different organizational demands, specialized party newspapers would be more likely to offer substantive issue discussion of elections than general news media. Conversely, general news newspapers would be more likely to use the strategic game frame in their election news coverage.

In addition to the party press, economic newspapers represent another type of specialized newspapers. These newspapers, which focus on the coverage of business and economic news, offer another opportunity to test how organizational factors affect media framing. The elite economic newspapers examined here have a clear editorial focus on economic and business-related information. They typically have a smaller audience that is already interested in such topics; they also tend to offer more thematic framing in their economic news coverage.³⁸ The specialized economic focus of these types of newspapers, however, does not imply that they do not report on political and election news. On the contrary, economic transformation, and its impact on foreign investment, banking regulations, and private business, among others, was

one of the most salient issues dominating Bulgarian politics since 1989. During such radical societal transformation, the political outcomes of competitive elections indisputably affect economic and business conditions, and such an impact is more pronounced than in established market economies. Thus, specialized economic newspapers are likely to provide more in-depth coverage of political events, policy developments, and their significance for private businesses and for the economy more generally, compared with general newspapers. They would be more likely to focus on broader issues rather than the horse-race aspects of the campaign. Thus, the use of the strategic game frame in economic newspapers will also be lower than that of general news dailies.

H3: Specialized party newspapers will employ the strategic game frame less frequently than general news newspapers.

H4: Specialized economic newspapers will employ the strategic game frame less frequently than general news newspapers.

Method and Data

The data for this study come from six national newspapers: *24 Chassa*, *Dneven Trud*, *Democratsia*, *Duma*, *Pari*, and *Kapital*. Election news articles published two weeks prior to each election during the 1990 to 2009 period were included in the analysis.³⁹ The dailies *24 Chassa* and *Dneven Trud* were chosen for analysis because they have the largest circulation in the country. *Democratsia* and *Duma* were chosen because they represent the newspapers of two major political parties—the Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) and the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP). The final two newspapers, *Pari* and *Kapital*, represent the most reputable and most popular economic newspapers in the country. The different types of newspapers allow us to test for the impact of media specialization on the framing of politics.

The unit of analysis was the individual news story, including hard news, features, interviews, and opinion pieces that focused on politics, political issues or events, or the election at large. Articles were retrieved manually from the Bulgarian National Library archive because no digital newspaper database was in existence. A total of 657 news stories were selected and coded.

The main variable of interest was the *strategic game frame*, which was defined as news coverage focusing on political strategy and tactics, current standing in the polls, who is winning and who is falling behind, and other horse-race aspects of the campaign.⁴⁰ Building on prior research, articles were coded as 1 if the strategic game frame was dominant, following a “macro” frame approach.⁴¹ Coders were trained using multiple examples of game-framed articles. Intercoder reliability testing was completed by two coders, both native speakers of Bulgarian, on 5% of the articles,⁴² which were randomly selected to include articles from the six different newspapers. Intercoder reliability using Cohen’s kappa was .75 for dominant frame and 1.0 for routine categories such as newspaper name, date, and story type.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics For All Variables

Variable	Observations	M	SD	Min	Max
Percentage strategic game frame	34	52.84	35.682	0	100
Party newspaper	34	0.32	0.475	0	1
Economic newspaper	34	0.32	0.475	0	1
Effective number of parties	34	2.77	0.983	1	4.8
Electoral system type	34	0.24	0.431	0	1

Two variables capturing variations in Bulgaria's political system were used as explanatory factors. First, we include a dichotomous variable for the type of electoral system used during each election in the period 1990 to 2009. During the 1990 and 2009 elections, Bulgaria had a mixed electoral system, combining the results from plurality SMDs with those from separately created and larger districts under PR rules. For these years, the electoral system variable was coded as 1. For the rest of the elections (1991, 1994, 1997, 2001, and 2005), a pure PR system, associated with a majoritarian WTA environment, was used, and these years were coded as 0.

As a second variable capturing the characteristics of the Bulgarian political system, we utilize a measure of the "effective number of parties" in government during each preelection cycle for the period 1990 to 2009. This measure, based on the widely used Laakso and Taagepera formula, reflects the number of parties in government, relative to their size, that is, the share of government portfolios that they control.⁴³

In addition, newspaper specialization was used as an independent variable. For the purpose of the statistical analysis, the political party newspapers (*Duma* and *Democratsia*) were coded as 1, and the other newspapers as 0. A dummy variable for economic focus was created as well, where the economic newspapers (*Pari* and *Kapital*) were coded as 1, and the rest as 0.

Based on the coding of the four main predictor variables, we expect a positive coefficient for type of electoral system, and negative coefficients for the other three variables, effective number of parties, and specialized party or economic newspaper, respectively. Finally, we add a control variable of election year as a proxy for the level of development of the media system. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for each variable in the regression model.

For the purposes of the analysis we aggregated the news-story-level data into newspaper/years, leading to thirty-four observations.⁴⁴ The dependent variable used in the regression testing was the percentage of stories in each newspaper and for each year that utilized the strategic game frame. To test the hypotheses discussed above, we conducted time series cross-sectional analysis, using Stata 11.1 software.⁴⁵

Results

The first two hypotheses test the assumption that the level of political consensus will affect the use of the strategic game frame in political news reporting. As shown in

Table 2. Predicting Strategic Game Frame Use In Bulgarian Election Articles.

Variable	Regression coefficient	PCSE
Electoral system	12.44*	(7.09)
Effective number of parties	-15.77**	(3.99)
Party newspaper	-12.06*	(6.10)
Economic newspaper	-4.71	(9.13)
Year	4.33**	(0.39)
Constant	-8561.24**	(709.49)
R^2	.33	
N	34	

Table shows regression coefficients with panel-corrected standard errors (PCSEs) in parentheses.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 2, this expectation is confirmed using two measures of political system characteristics, election system type (**H1**) and effective number of parties in government (**H2**). The use of a mixed electoral system, reflection of a political environment with a strong element of WTA politics, and thus a lower level of societal consensus are associated with a higher frequency of strategic game frame use by the media. The other measure of a consensus environment reflects the number of parties in government and produces the opposite expectation, that more parties in government will be associated with less use of strategic game framing. Both expectations are supported by the regression results presented in Table 2.

The next two hypotheses concern the role of newspaper type in framing of political news. More specifically, the hypotheses predicted that specialized media, both affiliated with a political party (**H3**) and focused on economic news (**H4**), would be less likely to use strategic game frames. The regression analysis confirms the first of these expectations, that is, that the specialized party-affiliated press is associated with lower frequency of use of strategic framing. The analysis shows that economic specialization has no significant impact on the use of strategic framing, although the regression coefficient is negative as expected. The control variable of election year is significant, showing that in the later years of democratic transition, the frequency of strategic game frame use by Bulgarian media increased. This finding indicates that reporting on political news became less issue-oriented over time.

Discussion

Consistent with global trends in political news coverage, the use of the strategic game frame in the Bulgarian press increased during the 1990 to 2009 period. It is apparent that national dailies increasingly cover election news by emphasizing the political strategies of competing candidates and parties and other horse-race aspects of election campaigns. These findings indicate that, by and large, the Bulgarian public was exposed to media coverage that focused on winners versus losers rather than substantive

discussion of political issues, perhaps following traditional news values of what makes news.⁴⁶ Irrespective of the reasons, one might conclude that Bulgarian citizens—particularly those reading general news dailies—knew more about the horse race between different politicians and political parties than the political issues of the day.⁴⁷

In addition to extending framing research to an Eastern European context, the study contributes to the framing literature by empirically testing for the impact of several institutional and organizational factors on election news framing. As such, the study goes beyond descriptive framing studies and answers the call for putting the sociological perspective back in framing research.⁴⁸ The results confirm that news frames are significantly influenced not only by political system characteristics, but also by meso-level factors. Specifically, we demonstrate that the type of electoral system and the number of parties in government, in addition to newspaper specialization, are significant predictors of strategic game framing. The results corroborate Harcup and O'Neill's claim that political institutions, as well as the newspaper's own agenda, significantly affect news coverage.⁴⁹

Consistent with theoretical expectations based on research coming primarily from the United States and Western Europe, we find that a greater level of national political consensus was associated with lower game frame use. The longitudinal analysis demonstrates that, similar to the media in established democracies, Bulgarian media's framing of election news is significantly affected by both the type of electoral system and the number of parties in government. Thus, our study corroborates empirical results from election news framing studies conducted in advanced democracies, such as Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.⁵⁰

Turning to the influence of organizational factors, our results show that newspapers associated with political parties are less likely to utilize the strategic game frame in their coverage than other types of Bulgarian newspapers, which means that they provide more issue coverage. From a theoretical standpoint, this finding is particularly interesting because it points to an underlying dilemma—those papers that have a clearer political leaning and are more likely to present their respective parties in a positive light are also the ones that offer a deeper level of discussion of the political issues of the day. Economic specialization of the media, however, did not significantly affect game framing. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that, as recently shown in the case of Danish election news coverage, media market factors may be less pronounced than political system/government factors.⁵¹

Admittedly, this study is limited to elite Bulgarian newspapers only; the patterns of election news framing may differ in the regional or tabloid press. Also, the analysis focused on the period preceding each election; it is conceivable that news framing may shift during a less intense campaign cycle or in postelection news reporting. Furthermore, there may be a number of other institutional and organizational factors besides the ones examined here that need to be included in future studies. In particular, cross-national training programs in journalism conducted in Bulgaria may have influenced the way the press covered political news, especially in the early years of the transition.

In conclusion, the present study extends framing research to a non-Western country where such research is extremely rare. It demonstrates empirically that both the national political environment as well as the characteristics of the media organization significantly influence the frame-building process. Finally, the analysis is based on a longitudinal research design, going beyond previous largely cross-sectional studies and thus eliminating the concern about cultural influences on media framing.

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27. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*.
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32. Nelly Beleva, "International News in the Bulgarian Press: The Impact of Politicization and the Role of Professionalism" (master's thesis, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, 2010).
33. IREX, "Media Sustainability Index: The Development of Sustainable Independent Media in Europe and Eurasia" (2010), <http://www.irex.org/msi> (accessed January 31, 2011).
34. IREX, "Media Sustainability Index," 35.
35. Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese, *Mediating the Message: Theories of Influences on Mass Media Content*, 2nd ed. (White Plains, NY: Longman, 1996), 139.
36. Beleva, "International News in the Bulgarian Press."
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38. Petia Kostadinova and Daniela V. Dimitrova, "Communicating Policy Change: Media Framing of Economic News in Post-Communist Bulgaria," *European Journal of Communication* 27 (2, 2012): 171-86.
39. We chose the two weeks leading up to each national election as this time frame is most likely to provide rich election news coverage. Previous European studies (e.g., Jochen Peter, Edmund Lauf, and Holli A. Semetko, "Television Coverage of the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections," *Political Communication* 21 [4, 2004]: 415-33; see also Pascale

Leroy and Karen Siune, "The Role of Television in European Elections: The Cases of Belgium and Denmark," *European Journal of Communication* 9 [1, 1994]: 47-69) have demonstrated that the coverage clusters around the final period preceding election day. This is especially the case in a new democracy like Bulgaria, where three of the elections covered in this study (1991, 1994, and 1997) were snap elections, the dates of which were announced only a month before.

40. Cappella and Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism*.
41. Each article could be either predominantly game, or issue-framed, which ensured there was no overlap between the frames. The issue frame encompassed news coverage emphasizing substantive political issues and policies, including proposals put forth by political candidates or parties and discussion of policy implications.
42. Daniel Riffe, Stephen Lacy, and Frederick G. Fico, *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Content Analysis in Research* (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1998).
43. Effective number of parties (ENP) is calculated as $N = 1/\sum p_i^2$, where n is the number of parties with at least one seat and p_i is the square of each party's proportion of all seats. While the Laakso and Taagepera measure of ENP was initially designed to characterize an entire party system, there is nothing inherent in the formula to prevent one from calculating the ENP in an electoral district, a legislature, or government. As a source of ENP in Bulgaria's governments over the twenty-year period, we use the Electoral Indices data set, designed to capture variation in the ENP at several levels in the political system, thus allowing for a more fine-tuned understanding of its competitiveness. Higher ENP in government is a proxy for greater level of consensus in the political system. The data set is publicly available at http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/EISystems/index.php.
44. While most newspapers were published during the entire period of the analysis, several of them were not published in every election year. *24 Chassa* and *Pari* started publication in 1991 and *Kapital* in 1994; *Duma* was not published in 2005, and *Demokratsia* stopped publication in 2001.
45. The time series cross-sectional regression analysis that we utilize here allows us (1) to control for the fact that the dependent variable varies both across the time and the space dimensions and (2) to estimate the impact of each independent variable while keeping the other explanatory factors constant.
46. Tony Harcup and Deirdre O'Neill, "What Is News? Galtung and Ruge Revisited," *Journalism Studies* 2 (2, 2001): 261-80.
47. Cappella and Jamieson, *Spiral of Cynicism*; Wolfsfeld, *Making Sense of Media and Politics*.
48. Vlienghart and van Zoonen, "Power to the Frame"; Boomgaarden et al., "News on the Move."
49. Harcup and O'Neill, "What Is News?"
50. Floss and Marcinkowski, "Do Media News Frames Reflect a Nation's Political Culture?"; Hänggeli and Kriesti, "Political Framing Strategies"; Lawrence, "Game-Framing the Issues"; Strömbäck and Dimitrova, "Political and Media Systems Matter."
51. David Nicolas Hopmann, Claes H. de Vreese, and Erik Albæk, "Incumbency Bonus in Election News Coverage Explained: The Logics of Political Power and the Media Market," *Journal of Communication* 61 (2, 2011): 264-82.